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domingo, 22 de marzo de 2020

The New Law, the New World Order, and the Cultural Revolution


By Alejandro Ordóñez Maldonado 


(Continued)


VIII. The New Law and the New World Order



"I may descend from those ancient men 
who in their caves painted animals, 
then vases, then gods and skies and
afterward erected cathedrals."

Father Leonardo Castellani

In his extraordinary book "El nuevo orden mundial en el pensamiento de Fukuyama" (The new world order in Fukuyama's thinking) Father Alfredo Sáenz explains in a clear and succinct way that the idea of a community, above national individualities, is an age-long yearning. After the instauration of the Roman Empire, which sought something similar, history knew a new attempt, this time under the aegis of Christianity. We refer to Christendom, which, in a certain way, took over the old empire, although with a new spirit. As is well known it is necessary to distinguish Christianity from Christendom. Christianity is the individual practice of Christian Doctrine; it can occur in heathen countries or even in anti-Christian ones. Christendom, in contrast, exists where the spirit of the Gospel gets to impregnate the temporal order, the culture, the arts, the economy, labor, and, above all, politics; his holiness, Pope Leo XIII, in his Encyclical Immortale Dei, describes it masterfully:  "There was once a time when the States were governed in accordance with Christian philosophy, and in which the splendor of evangelic wisdom and its divine virtue guided the laws, the institutions, the mores, the social classes, and the multiple manifestations of the life of the peoples". It was a globalization of the temporal order in which the social need of Christ and of its mystical body ─ the Church ─ was recognized, and which started to dismember beginning in the Sixteenth Century, with the consequent disappearance of that union of Christian nations. A new union was attempted again at the beginning of the Twentieth Century; as far as being a universal community they could be considered similar, with this small distinction, that the current one is without Christ and even more, against Christ and His only Church, and this has always been the intention of Freemasonry, to build a world order that would be a caricature or rather a parody of Christianitas, in which humanity be the union of men without charity, without God, and without Christ. To consolidate this, they have counted with the aid of unbeatable allies, or rather with efficacious instruments: the first one, the Society of Nations or United Nations, which guarantee the global hegemony of the new lords of the world; the second one, UNESCO, organism dependent on the first one which has as its purpose to create a single world culture, and of course the synarchist power, which among its great spokesmen are Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Henry Kissinger. The former, in his book The Technocratic Era claims that thanks to technological progress, above all nuclear physics and computers, we will enter a new era, that of global political progress, in which the unity of the human species will be brought about, in which the transnational corporations will supplant the States, for which reason we should resign ourselves to see the various homelands disappear.

Hereafter, Father Sáenz continues, quoting Alberto Caturelli, the United States will be the "intra-worldly providence of history, the depositary of the highest aims." And, what are these aims? Economic growth, welfare, secular messianism, globalism without homelands; attainable with the aid of computers and of a universal language, English. Professor Antonio Caponetto in his book on the new world order quotes Pierre Virion, who three decades ago made known in his works the universal domination plans in which the aforementioned synarchist plan is evidenced, mentioning one of its principal ideologues, Saint Yves de Alveydre, who proposed as a motto the edification of a Novus Ordo Saeclorum, a new, agnostic and fatherland-free, syncretic and irenicist, order, in which the fusion of the opponents of Christian Civilization would take place. Today, it has been already proclaimed and fully instaurated, and is characterized by the following, as described by the latter of the aforementioned authors:

The World as a manipulable circuit

The world would be a simple international electrically connected net, with its plants, distribution stations, primary and secondary branch lines, switches and general and specific laws. When an overload or an excess resistance takes place, exceeding that calculated by the engineers who projected it and built it, a short circuit is produced. This is equivalent to a coup d'etat, a dictatorship, the rise of an unimagined force or a local conflict. If it becomes generalized as a countercurrent, an extension of the counteracting system or of the conflict occurs. The global village is an electrified world capable of instantaneous connections. Any leftover of patriotism or sovereignty, any vestige of intense religious life capable of influencing public conduct, any autonomous decision with respect to the system programmers, is seen worriedly as a disrupter that has to be immediately adjusted; any gesture that threatens the functioning of the net will be disqualified, first as a destabilizer and quickly disconnected, regardless of whether to do that it becomes necessary to pass over uncountable bodies with the pretext of keeping the validity of universal democracy (Bosnia, Irak).

Rejection of nationalism

One of the most notable spokesmen for the New World Order, as was Zbigniew Brzezinzki, mentions without qualms in his book on the new world order, that there will be a unification of the human genre, globalization of consciences, of communities, such an august future ruled by the United States that it will no longer be sensible nor necessary to think in national nor religious terms. What is national, as well as "Institutionalized Christianity¨ will disappear.


Immanentist Messianism

The two modern prophets of the current reordering, Edwin Toffler and Francis Fukuyama, describe such character in a hair raising manner. Professor Caponetto synthesizes the doctrine of such authors in the following way: "It will be a global, homogeneous world, dominated by the triumph of liberalism and democracy, of market economy and indiscriminate pluralism." A world of consumers ─ faith, nationality, art and philosophy cornered into the realm of the individual's alternatives ─ a messianic conception, strongly secularized, anthropocentric, and immanent, which centers in itself and makes depend the new generation of the human species upon itself.

Compulsive homogenization: uniformity of the sense of existence, of language and of faith.

It is a kind of post-modern inquisition which has as its leitmotif the eternal liberal motto "make yourself free or I'll kill you". Men and peoples are uniformized evermore for the sole political option which compulsorily will be a democracy. We are obligated to be democratic as the United States, or social-democratic, but maintaining the notions of privatization, weakening of the State, absolute non-confessionalism, integral laicism, a market economy, moral permissivism, hetero-directed citizens, with no more opinions or information than that generated by the mainstream media.

Let us not be naíve; it would be impossible to conceive the aforementioned new universal design without a juridical instrument that would guarantee the consolidation of such macro project with theological, philosophical and cultural expressions. Such an instrument is none other than the juridical philosophy of the New Law herein analyzed, which is being imposed without the least resistance on even the most remote corners of the global village, pulverizing all beliefs, all sovereignties, all national traditions, by means of the expedient, well-known in our legal system, of the constitutional blocks which today form part of most of the legal systems. The global society does not tolerate the affirmation of a national being. The national states disappearing, what sense would there be in maintaining the legal and juridical particularities? What reason would there be, living in a global village, for maintaining diverse, and even contradictory, constitutions and legislations? Such obstacles, according to the mind of the designers of the global village, should be removed, and for that purpose, no more efficacious instrument exists than the New Law and the constitutional state, which end up reducing the entire juridical order to the constitutional principles and values for which application, judges other than constitutional judges will not be required. No more than one decade will pass, perhaps less, in which, of the entire juridical system, only the constitution will subsist, and thousands of judges applying the constitutional jurisprudence; it will be the full application of the New Law. Once this has happened, once the plural system of courts and national legal particularities has been dismantled, there will be no sense in having national constitutions, and constitutional judges much less. They will also disappear to give way to the world constitution developed by means of international treaties and by the jurisprudence of transnational judges.

Is this not, gentlemen, the case of the International Criminal Court and of the Inter American Human Rights System? As explained by Patricio Randle in El Derechothe journal of law and jurisprudence:
"The declared purpose of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the bases of which were established in Rome in July 1998, which were ratified by practically all countries in the world, with the exception of China and the United States, is to try those persons who have been accused of the gravest international crimes, such as war crimes, or crimes against humanity, genocide or aggression.
Specifically, the court menaces with diminishing the sovereignty of the member sates, with carrying out a discretional, politicized justice, and bringing about a jurisdictional monstrosity. 
Argentine should not ratify the agreement which so much infringes upon the ban against double jeopardy, the right to an impartial judge, and the right to confront the opposing witnesses. Despite that, with 116 articles and 200 options debated by over 100 nations and organizations, the Rome Conference has created a real legal monstrosity."
Richard Wilkins, law school professor at Brigham Young University is disturbed because "This tribunal claims for itself jurisdiction over any person inhabiting the globe, which converts it into an organ of international government, a matter as novel as it is dangerous since it implies that globalization of justice will become a vehicle for radical policies."

The preamble of the project of the Statute of the ICC establishes that the court "should be complementary to the criminal justice systems of the nations in those cases that judicial processes are not possible or can be inefficacious."

All right an well but how will inefficacy be determined without entering a dark and disputable area? In fact, the ICC, on invalidating the national trials and pretending to define what is an efficacious process and what is not, appropriates to itself a kind of juridical power to review all the criminal systems in the world. Which definitively would be tantamount to constituting itself in a de facto supreme judicial vigilant.

Another aspect of the matter which places it in the shadows is the pretense of not putting limits to the reach of the ICC when dealing additionally with various other types of offenses without specifying which. This enables Amnesty International to claim that "perpetrators of human rights violations should be tried" (The Quest for International Justice: Time for a permanent International Court, July 1995.

It is an almost universally accepted principle, known as non bis in idem, which establishes that a person may not be tried for the same offense twice. Despite that, the ICC does not recognize such right since, as said before, it appropriates to itself the authority of deciding what is an efficacious trial and what is not.

In a letter to Wilson Cary Nicholas of 1803, Thomas Jefferson defended the supremacy of the American Constitution above international treaties, writing: "Our private security lies in having a written constitution. Let us not make of this a blank paper to be interpreted. I say the same of the opinion of those who consider that a treaty grants unlimited power. If this is so, then we have no constitution."

It is obvious that Argentine is not a country zealous of its rights and is open to admitting a reduction of its legal sovereignty and has no qualms in letting others interfere in pacifying operations with juridical pretexts of questionable doctrine, favoring a selective and politicized international doctrine capable of engendering a jurisdictional monstrosity."

The power of the ICC is truly overwhelming, although is Statute in articles fifth to eighth define which offenses will be subjected to its jurisdiction, it does not do it for the crime of aggression, leaving then to the assembly of participating states what should be understood for such crime. It is a blank norm which could include any conduct considered 'politically incorrect', thus giving authority to the assembly of participating states to alter the national constitutions.

Consolidated the above, we will definitively enter the global village, I can already hear the clanking of the chains, the stench of the great tyrant can already be perceived.

By means of Legislative Act 02 of 2001, the State of Colombia modified its National Constitution adding Article 93 which recognizes the jurisdiction of the ICC in the terms established by the Rome Statute; later, Law 742 of June 5, 2002, approved such statute, declared attainable by the Constitutional Court by means of Sentence C-578 / 02.

I wish to be wrong, I hope I am wrong, I hope it is the result of so much science fiction to which television subjects us every day, I hope they are unfounded predictions, I hope and pray mine is a very wrong prediction, I hope what the almost preppy daughter of mine once told me was right: "Dad, how embarrassing, get it over with, don't be so intense, how tenacious of you!" But that intensity is founded on stubborn facts. What I am doing is simply drawing the consequences by observing the episodes which present before our eyes on a daily basis.

I recall today, because it fits like a glove, the description an Argentinian professor made of that utopian village, quite well called 'Cosmic Citizenship':
"The entire globe is an electrical connection which is turned on and off at the whim of its designers, with the docile compilcity of its native operators."
But that is characteristic of the culture in which we are immersed, to which we arrived after traversing four centuries since the renaissance, a legacy of modernity now turned into post-modernity; I understand we live in a skeptical world where a fashionable dilettantism triumphs, where it is necessary to give the appearance of being neuter if we want to be accepted by the holders of public opinion or if we want to be admitted to the right circles. If we want to acquire the cosmic citizenship, we are obligated to be light men, which purposely is similar to the so-called light products so in vogue today: food without calories, lard without grease, beer without alcohol, sugar without glucose, tobacco without nicotine, skimmed milk... a new, decaffeinated man whose slogan is eating everything without calories; ultimately, a man without substance, without contents, devoted to money, to power, to success, to limitless and unrestricted pleasure, with no personal opinion to give and over almost nothing, people with plenty of things but out in the open metaphysically.

Ernesto Sábato, in an interview given to La Nación newspaper, describes that man with a crude realism: 
"The mechanization, robotization, alienation, de-sacralization of man, the capitalistic and industrial concentration, produced in the most 'advanced' regions, a man dispossessed of individual relevance, an interchangeable man, like those appliances made by serial production. Modernity gave effect to a sinister paradox: man achieved the conquest of the world of things at the expense of his own objectification; massification suppressed individual desires because the capitalist or communist superstate requires identical men. In the best of cases it collectivizes the senses, massifies the instincts, dulls the sensibilities througn television, unifies tastes through advertising and its slogans; on leaving their factories or offices, men and women, who are the slaves of machines and computers, take refuge in massified sports, in the illusory world of pulp novels and television series made by other machines. These are times when men feel metaphisically out in the open. That science, which the ingenuous thought was going to provide the solution to all of man's physical and spiritual problems, produced instead these gigantic states with their dehumanization. The twentieth century, hidden in the dark, as a sadist thief awaiting a pair of lovers."
Paraphrasing Nicolás Gómez Dávila in his memorable scholia, we can say without fear of being wrong: "If the modern industry has not yet attained manufacturing bodies, it has succeeded in manufacturing souls."

It is precisely the opposite of the man with the legacy of Spanish culture; following Gustavo Thibon, we can assert that: 
"Traditional man is characterized by a double tie, toward the high and toward the low. Toward the high because he never obviated the consideration of God, of the transcendent, in his life. Toward the low because he was rooted upon the land, upon reality. This double rooting conferred a sense of his existence in the world. Modern man has broken both ties, that one which united him with the high because he has experienced the feasibility of living prescinding of God, and that one which tied him with the low because he has abandoned the land, the reality, installing himself in a utopism. Perhaps the best figure of this man might be the artificial plant, this plant lacks roots; it looks not toward the high as it ignores the sunlight, not toward the low as it receives not the humidity of the soil. Such is the man of our time, an unhinged being, and consequently, he has become susceptible to being easily transplanted."
The lost harmony will not be brought back to us by the new world order, in vain will all unilateral organisms plow in the sea and build on the desert. It is not the humanitarian international law nor the Geneva Protocol what today´s society requires to return to its course; what it requires is, by the way, what constitutes the essence of Spanishness, individuals and societies recognizing themselves subjected to him who said: "Without me, nothing can you do." He is the salvation of individuals and societies.

Current unanimousness which so much brags of tolerance does not tolerate that the secular dogmas, such as those just controverted, be questioned, and has constructed a religiously, politically, philosophically and juridically correct way of thinking outside of which there is no salvation. Well, you may have noted that I practice the incorrectness, I cannot accommodate to that official truth, I am a kind of heretic of modernity and of post-modernity, a rara avis. Because of this, it could well be said that the foregoing is an unattainable text of the philosophically incorrect; or, if it suits you best, the confession of a reactionary; what can we do, the pluralist society, and the Colombian State is so, cannot but bear with those of us who controvert the principles of what today is called the politically and philosophically correct. If they are truly pluralists, they should be coherent with their pluralism, otherwise, they would fall on the criticism which, lucidly, Vázquez de Mella used to make about the mentors of modernity and post-modernity:
"What incongruency, what incongruency, to erect stands to the principles and scaffolds to their consequences.

Alejandro Ordóñez Maldonado 

martes, 18 de febrero de 2020

The New Law, the New World Order, and the Cultural Revolution


By Alejandro Ordóñez Maldonado 


(Continued)


VII. Contemporary Constitutionalism, Individualism, and Postmodernity.



The liberal constitution concept has been pulverized by the prophets of the New Law, and we have passed now from a State Constitution which organizes the political power to one which designs, creates and modifies the social order in a totalitarian manner by means of ideologized decisions of the constitutional judge. As accurately recognized with a cyphered language by Doctor Diego López Medina in his text "The impure theory of law", the new law, with a dose of unresolved anxiety for influence, has undertaken the task of deconstructing our juridical tradition and the foundational values of our nationality, to rebuild it or rather re-found it, entering without hindrance, according to his view, in the post-modern global village by way of the purpose of socializing the constitution. "Ideological pluralism placed the task of proclaiming society's moral criteria on the agenda of justice, and that way the constitutional courts replaced the churches in the task of defining the culture's moral parameters", with its pontiffs, its dogmas, its crusades, its sins. and its heresies.

With such conception, contemporary constitutionalism, in its transit from modernity to post-modernity has created a citizen with unlimited and limitless rights who: "... demands everything for himself against the authorities who try to rule him, against the community to which he belongs, against the rest of men; in a word, against anything that makes him uncomfortable or eclipses him. All authority or right of any kind over men is excluded. It is only rights of the individual against anyone who could or would threaten them, avoid them or suspend them: rights of the child against his parents, rights of the women against men, rights of the State against the Church, and forming all of them a liberation front: rights of man against God."

Rightly does Professor Villey point out: "We do not easily get to reconcile these rights our time segregates everywhere, rights to prudishness and to sexual liberty; rights to life and to abortion; rights to marry and to divorce. Americans are ahead of us even more in the intensive and daily fabrication of new rights of man. In these post-modern times, the inventive genius keeps ceaselessly feeding new rights; today, such rights, affirms Juan Fernando Segovia in the afore quoted book, are recognized and guaranteed by the national constitutions as well as by international instruments which obligate states to modify their internal norms in the name of an active, solidary and integrated humanity, even, in some regions, rights of nonhumans, as happens with animals, have been consecrated. This overabundance serves, above all, to feed a multitude of demands that are impossible of fulfillment. When people come back to reality, they become disappointed and bitter." The supreme rule of the common good disappears to the benefit of the supreme rule of liberty; if modernity liberated civil society from the Church's beneficial influence, post-modernity will do the same from that of the State itself, even of the constitutional dominations and powers, diluting itself by means of the reign of conscientious objections, of privatizations and, in sum, of the private good; the well-known formulas of supremacy of the law, of sovereignty, and of public good could well make their entrance today into a museum of juridical archeology. Professor Thomas Molnar, in a series of recent essays, has left us a personal vision of the above in which he calls the apogee of civil society and the hegemony of free thought turned into the sole ideological expression authorized today.

Not that someone with a Thomistic formation may be ignoring the existence of human rights; on the contrary, they are as old as man himself. God completed His creation adopting man as His child and endowing him with the rights corresponding to his dignity. He is their author, not the French Revolution nor the United Nations' declaration nor the international treaties; they are the instruments of an ideology which in nothing resembles the Thomistic tradition on natural rights; let's not forget that all conception of such rights depends on the notion of the human person that is accepted, and as we Catholics see in it human and divine values, we can understand that this duality will affect those rights; quite different is the case for those who deny man's transcendence, his ultimate end; or for those that deny that persons have a nature... Never before in the history of humanity had human rights been so much ignored but also never before the absence of God in society had been so general; that is why the only way of guaranteeing the human rights is by defending the rights of God in society.

We are facing the radicalization of libertarian possessive individualism, where reason has died to give way to sensibility, emotion, imagination, fantasy, experimentation, and fabulation. this is why in today's language, to say "I feel like"  or "...gives me a bad vibe" is now in fashion. 

"The new rights are the sign of a new social tragedy since they sanction anti-social conduct, oblivious to any social or political coaction, freed to an extremely privatized morality. Exaggeration of the differences leads to picking the condition of the excluded as a paradigm of rights. They are, in a sense, rights to exclusion, rights to ¨do as we please,¨ rights to consumption and to alienation, to give or not give sense to one`s life, to build or destroy oneself, to direct one's personal life or not to direct it. These are the tragic rights of a destructured society.

We are now living through the ideological canonization of human rights. This is manifested by their boundless diffusion and their galloping influence, which has created a civil religion taught at school and propagated by communications media and by a multitude of bureaucratic and private channels. In it, we find the Marxist influence which considers man an alienated whose nature is not a given but a free construction of his own authenticity, as if each one could configure his being in an independent manner and, being responsible only to himself. Human nature deconstructed, it will not be possible to know other than by ideology, what is idoneous to man; the state apparatus ends up being converted into an instrument of mutation of human nature, regulating the cultural revolution to which we have been making reference.

To rescue the human rights from this highjacking to which I have been referring, good intentions are not enough, it is necessary to go back to Catholic natural law, which founds the juridical norms on the concrete relationships of individuals; it is the only solution remaining to those who have the mission of acting prudently in a just order. It would be necessary to retrace the secularization route traveled by Western culture and defeat the world that encloses the rights of man in the ideological circle of democracy and liberalism and the emancipating project they embody.

It is necessary, then, to seek the solution in a different plane, recovering the metaphysical foundation of law, as noted by González Pérez: "Man will only regain security and confidence when he recovers the conscience that his dignity is not tangible, not because it has been decided so by an international assembly, a dictator or a parliament, but because it is so prescribed by the eternal Law.

Without this return to metaphysics, in constitutional law nothing more will remain than the disappointed assertion of Saint Exupery: "What do we care for the political doctrines which pretend to attain the plenitude of men, if in the first place we do not know the kind of man they want to form."

Of course, I know well the criticisms to the above assertion that will be made from the spokesmen of a secular society habituated to the destruction of all its foundations: ¨ Natural law is suspect, religious in its origin and metaphysical, inadequate to a pragmatic and pluralistic society."

Antonin Scalia, United States Supreme Court Justice, cited by Thomas Molnar in ¨ Natural Law and Positive Law in the Anglo Saxon World¨ has claimed that the natural law positions represent fanatism and intolerance; but in turn, those who put themselves on guard before natural law have no qualms in claiming that the ultimate juridical authority is simply the individual's free will. Undoubtedly, this philosophy is not very far away from anarchy.

domingo, 9 de febrero de 2020

The New Law, the New World Order, and the Cultural Revolution


By Alejandro Ordóñez Maldonado 


(Continued)


VI. Human Dignity and the Cultural Revolution

Today, it is not necessary to send armies to
take over the entire world. It suffices with
subjecting the world spiritually and culturally.

Alexander Solzhenitsyn

Never before in history had it been insisted so much upon human dignity as the foundation for a legal system, and on the primacy of the inalienable rights of the individual, but it is also true that never in the history of legality had the common good as a limit to such primacy been forgotten as now. An individualist doctrine has been tried to construct, in which the dignity of man has been caricatured, reducing it exclusively to liberty, and liberty to the absence of coercion; desire and appetite without any limitation would become a foundation of law, in consequence, within such sui/generis personalism the autonomy of the individual would become the sole foundational value for legality, giving no consideration to the others as an essential element of law, or the fulfillment of duty, and much less the common good.

The right to make valid any act willed by the state or by the individual as a right, even when sometimes limited for utilitarian reasons, would be absolute relativism: Everyone can claim the most strange, contradictory and even absurd things as rights; without doubt, we would have to conclude that anarchy is a right. We are heading toward an inexorable degradation with the pretext of the validity of a new dogma or rather a Utopia, called by some the free development of our animality, a perfect caricature of the true development of personality which proposes man to rid himself even of his own nature. This has entailed a rapid process of moral dissolution or of collective degradation which, if not stopped, will end up having the classical concept of social liberty as ordered liberty disappear. In the end, the war of all against all will ensue.

Is perhaps the above not the ideological support for the personal drug dose, suicide, abortion, homosexual unions, euthanasy, eugenics, incest, anonymous maternity, zoophilia, and whatnot, recognized by diverse international treaties and by a great majority of national legal systems and justified in the name of the new secular dogmas. The tolerance, pluralism, non-discrimination, to which the entire society is being led, whether by means of State programs implemented by the ministries of health and education or by means of decisions proferred by the Constitutional Court in sentences which make reference to the free development of our personality.  Having the State lost its moral dimension, it turns into a clear abetter of social disorder. This is an authentic cultural revolution in which the school our children attend, our families, the business where we work, the mentality, politics, religion, morality, in sum our entire life has to conform itself with those 'politically correct' postulates.

With great acuteness, the prologue of the text "La Revolución Cultural; un smog que envenena a la familia chilena" (The Cultural Revolution; a smog that poisons the Chilean family), reads ¨Yes, a revolution that penetrates as smog in all environments, gradually contaminating laws and customs, corroding principles, eliminating the notions of good and evil and implementing a new, atheist and relativist morality and that additionally prepares the juridical and publicity climate to persecute those who oppose any degree of resistance¨,  it is a program of deconstruction of what remains of a Christian inspired society, to impose a model relativist in its ideology and immoral in its conduct; its doctrinaire foundation lies on a peculiar interpretation of human rights, dispensing fully of the Church teachings and of the Christian nature of our people. Of course, all of the preceding carried out by the dictatorship of the tolerant,  who are practicing a far-reaching social chirurgy, cutting off the Christian roots of our society and imposing a Freudian pansexuality, demolishing of the family and of all our traditions.

Unabashedly, Rodolfo Llopis, leader of the PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers Party), recognizes the agenda that socialism has devised on the topic:

"To me, no revolution takes place simply by the carrying out of a change in the political regime. Not even when together with the change in the political regime a social change takes place, is there a revolution. To me, the revolutionary cycle does not end until the revolution takes place in the conscience of the people... it is necessary to take over the souls of the children." After that would come – and we are experiencing it in our politics – what the Italian thinker Antonio Gramsci proposed: Marxianize the interior man without violence or bloodshed, it matters not to conquer the streets and towns, what must be conquered is the mind of civil society, especially in Hispanic America and the South of Europe; all the habitats, the customs, the social institutions where Roman Catholicism has more deeply guided the thinking and actions of the generality of populations, where it has been fulfilled to the letter by actions of the aforementioned state and judicial organisms. It is necessary, in compliance with the commitments of the Cultural Revolution, to alter such mind, turn it into its opposite in every detail, so that it turns not only into a non-Christian mind but into an anti-Christian mind. Such goals have been attained by means of a quiet and anonymous revolution in the name of human dignity and human rights, and in the name of liberty and autonomy with respect to external restrictions.

The ideology of human rights which rules at the present time ends up fostering the absolute liberation of man from all kinds of powers and dominations, even the constitutional ones. Such ideology, in its liberal origin, makes man independent not only of kings and privileges but basically of God, of its law and of religion, then of material inequalities and at the present time seeks to free us from anything which limits man's autonomy, starting with our own body; it is the primacy of the individual body to which reason is now subjected, to such a degree has it been dogmatized that authority of any order which does not subject itself to such ideology will be deemed to be illegitimate by NGOs and multilateral organisms. Today the favorite targets of the cultural revolution are not the military headquarters or the public offices as it once used to be; today, as said before, it is the souls of children, it is an unnoticed ideological transfer produced in a subtle manner in our entire culture. The taking of the Winter Palace, Gramsci sometime said referring to the political power, is the last thing to try; the taking over of the culture should come first.

Our ineffable Nicolás Gómez Dávila summarizes this in one of his erudite extraordinary sentences or scholia as they are popularly known: "The revolution only invades palaces previously deserted."


jueves, 2 de enero de 2020

The New Law, the New World Order, and the Cultural Revolution



By Alejandro Ordóñez Maldonado




(Continued)

V. Judicial Voluntarism or Imagination as a Source of Law.


The judge forms his conviction neither by means of
logical deductions nor of thorough studies of pre-
existing doctrine, but through the instantaneous
formation of a "hunch" which tells him the concrete
direction his decision should take.

Diego Lòpez Medina

Anyone who is moderately familiar with the topic will notice a perfect coincidence between the Calvinist juridical doctrine and the New Law; it suffices to simply secularize it for a new school of judicial interpretation to emerge, or if you wish to be more precise, sacralization in the new school will turn around the constitutional judge and the constitutionality blocks, the rest is the same Calvinist doctrine already explained. The great majority of New Law authors hail from countries where Calvinism established itself in the social, political and cultural institutions of their regions. Having assimilated religious Calvinism, they incorporated it in judicial Calvinism. It suffices to cite a few examples:

In 1876, German jurist Siegmund Schlossmann (1844-1909), one of the forerunners of the School of Free Law transforms the creative activity of law into a certain, imprecise juridical sentiment at the same time conceived as rational and felt as an intuition. In turn, another German treatise writer, Oskar von Bülow (1837-1907), influenced by the historical school of law, in his text "The Law and the Judge's Ministry" proposes that the law is only a remote presupposition of the sentence. The judge is the exclusive determinant of the law and he is subjected to the norm as an indicative criterion only; he is in the condition of setting the exact law, even when his decisions may depart or contradict the legal precepts, the which possess only a merely indicative value. Eugen Ehrlich in 1888 published the well-known text "On the Loopholes of the Law" which in his opinion would be being resolved in concordance with the personal convictions of the judge. The text of the latter author, taken as reference by the local authors of the same school, shapes all of the theses of the Free Law movement:
  • Equating the functions of judges and legislators,
  • Reducing the norms to the role of simple indicators for the judge, lacking imperativeness,
  • Reducing the law to the decisions of the judges.
 In 1906, Hermann Kantorowicz publishes what has been considered the Free Law Manifesto under the title of "The Struggle for the Science of Law". There he straightforward claims that statutes are not a source of law, opening fire against what he considers legalist dogmatism, reducing law to the expression of judicial will, as he himself states: "the law freely determined by the judge but properly ascertained" this in plain language means that the judge does what he wills without the precepts getting in the way, with the only requirement that he reasons his decision.

These are the same principles taken these days as dogmas in our legal system, it suffices to read the sentences, quoted several times, or what one of our most distinguished domestic authors says in that respect: "The conflict is resolved without resorting to positive texts regulating the integrity of the typified institution. Rather, juridical argumentation is founded on less linear discursive logic... Instead of specific rules of conduct, the adoption of standards or principles which, outlining a very general rule, leave its concrete adaptation to a prudential judgment of the interpreter and not to the foreseeing capability of the legislator."

He goes further on asserting: "the judge acts as a producer of material justice visions and develops active virtues that put him in contact with, for instance, public expenditure ordering and managing." Contemporary constitutionalism assumes this doctrine fully. When a judge decides to ignore the statute or even the Constitution, he does it wielding as a pretext his duties of protection of the constitutional principles or values consigned in the Constitution or in some international treaty which form part of the constitutionality blocks; but, of course, nobody knows the contents of such principles or values.

It is the judge who, capriciously, provides the principles and values in each sentence. In practice, this is what happens, the large quantity of contradictory precedents so indicates. Rightly, Doctor Juan Manuel Charry, former dean of the law school of Universidad del Rosario, calls attention to the "uncertain and unpredictable character of constitutional control"; in the same vein, Doctor Sandra Morelli points out: "The Constitutional Court creates uncertainty... ignores our system of sources of law... and rids itself of any juridical ties... which is disadvantageous to the nation in general." Beyond a disadvantage, we are facing a constant altering of the Constitution by judicial means.

It is the paroxysm of judicial voluntarism, which many have compared with a Government by Judges, but would be more accurate to designate as Judicial Tyranny exclusive of the statutes and of logic in the judicial formation of law. As properly recognized by Kantorowicz, it is the Lutheran reply to the intellectualist harmonizing aim of Thomism. One of the authors of North American realism, quoted by Dr. Diego López Medina in his text "El Derecho de los Jueces" (The Law of Judges) states: "Source of law is not only the judge's notion that certain rules are valid law, but also his personal prejudices, his sympathies or antipathies, his whims, and private interests; in sum, everything which in any circumstance can psychologically influence his decision."

If I claim that imagination is for the New Law a source of law, I could be disqualified as an exaggerated critic, but it suffices for me to quote the following texts to free myself of such accusation. United States Federal District Judge Joseph Hutcheson, as quoted by Dr. Diego López Medina in his text "El Derecho de los Jueces" explains how he resolved a difficult judicial controversy: "I, after having gone over all materials at my disposal, and duly reflecting on them, let my imagination free, and considering the case carefully, I await the sensation, the hunch, that beam of understanding which in an instant allows me to make connection between the problem and the decision and, at the point where the road becomes darker for the judge, sheds its light along the route." The same author in trying to give an explanation of the hunch as a source of law sets forth the following text:
"Some call it intuition, some imagination, that sensibility to new ideas, this power to explore when there is no path..."
If someone should still harbor some doubts about the juridical effects which the School of New Law confers to the imagination, I think the following quote will clear all doubt: "Does all this lead to anarchy and the destruction of any and all security feeling? I don't think so. True security, absolute security, 100% security, we cannot attain. We can get close to it, but nothing more. Our worry is the prophecy... we should not fear arbitrariness.¨

Very little has been researched about the ideological and political contents of the New Law in university lectures, in doctrinal texts and in law firms. It is welcome with zeal by some or condemned with ardor by others, but all without further analysis.

The former are imbued with the mythical idea of inexorable progress which, as Maritain will remind us: "Produces ritual resonances in the imagination", making them embrace anything new simply because it is new, equating it with the better without taking any other consideration into account. For them, the New Law is something novel and, as we have seen, reason enough to be accepted, considering that it responds to the law of history and its unstoppable advance, which no one can resist except for a few who are unaware of the "sense of history"; therefore, the principles on which it is founded will be taken as an apodictic truth, as a secular dogma of a new religion, with strange docility in the majority of cases, and because of intellectual laziness, the same texts, the same authors, the same arguments, the same precedents, are reproduced, despite their repeatedly resorting to ideological pluralism to justify "innovative decisions"; their thinking turns into gross dogmatism without any antecedents in constitutional history. 

The latter circumscribe the controversy to a problem of judicial technique, reducing the entire debate to a conflict of constitutional competences, failing to point to their true nature when actually the technical aspects are perfectly secondary.

We have transitioned from a legalistic fetishism, where the law, divorced from the natural order and the common good, ends up being an instrument of private interests, efficacy taking precedence over justice, to the judicial fetishism of the New Law, where the judge, freed from any positive statute, ends up making of his whims the most important source of law. Both fetishisms share the same voluntarism except that the former place it on the head of the legislator and the latter on the head of the judge; voluntarism is their connecting thread. We are facing an apparent contradiction which is not resolved within the constitutional frameworkñ there, a philosophical error - voluntarism- simply manifests itself; that error owes a debt to the liberal juridical positivism which arose with the French Revolution as well as to the New Law, juridical expression of post-modernity, a mark which we can find in Kelsen, Bobbio or Hart as well as in Dworkin, Alexy or Heck, to cite the better known. The New Law in the philosophic sphere is simply the unfolding of voluntarism or, if you wish, of nominalism which, as rightly claimed by Villey, is interested only in nature's technical usefulness, reducing it to that and rejecting its objective value as well as the good and the just, leaving the will free to create them at their whim. Because of that, neither the ones nor the others accept limits other than their own will, which in the former takes the form of one half plus one, and in the latter the form of constitutionality blocks.

As said before, the will has limits fixed by natural law, since it cannot go against the nature of things; and it cannot found any obligation and, consequently, any right. When something in itself runs in contradiction with natural law, it cannot be justified by human will.

Professor Francisco Elías de Tejada, whom we have been following in a disorderly fashion, masterfully concludes: "In essence, the school of Free Law and its current shameful successors end up consecrating the voluntarism which perennially corrodes the law in the course of the centuries, above and beyond whatever rules the judges could create with their will following these trends, the juridical norm is always dictated by reason under penalty of excesses and arbitrariness." We can only annotate that, where said writer refers to voluntarism as a movement permanently corruptive of the law, it should be read to apply to the new law as well as to juridical positivism. 

(To be continued)

Go back to Chapter iv

sábado, 28 de diciembre de 2019

The New Law, the New World Order, and the Cultural Revolution



By Alejandro Ordóñez Maldonado


(Continued)

iv. The Calvinist Origin of the New Law


"The source of  all wrongs lies in the
candid optimism of most of the public
men of our nineteenth century, who
indiscriminately applied the English
liberal doctrine and the essential
North American public law principles
in our land without realizing that the
new creed could not signify any
progress in Latin America.

Alfonso López Michelsen.

It has been well said, by authors of the most dissimilar extraction, that behind every political issue lies a theological issue, an assertion which for many chaste democratic ears is inadmissible and extravagant, but which for renowned writers of Colombian constitutional history, such as Alfonso López Michelsen and Leopoldo Uprimy results in a basic presupposition to understand our institutions. Let us remember the famous debate at the Universidad Nacional between the two above, sometime around 1950, which versed precisely on the topic, and was left in writing in two well-known publications: "La Estirpe Calvinista de Nuestras Instituciones" (The Calvinist Lineage of our Institutions) and "Capitalismo Calvinista o Romanticismo Semiescolástico de los Próceres de la Independencia Colombiana.  Réplica al Profesor Alfonso López Michelsen"  which I have re-read carefully and which might well have been titled "The Scholastic Lineage of our Institutions."

I confess that the origin of the writers of treatises on the New Law called more my attention every time, in their great majority Anglo-Saxon or German, regions where Calvinism has designed their political, social and cultural institutions until I found in the work of Professor Francisco Díaz de Tejada the most substantial study on the relationship between Calvinism and the New Law, which in its fundamental ideas I will follow in the following paragraphs, making some brief comments.


Text by Francisco Díaz de Tejada

For Catholic Theology, the Universe has an immanent order willed by God, contained in the natural law, which reason can discover, and which in its physical aspect is complied with by every being, but in its moral aspect man can disobey.

Man's eternal destiny depends on the use of his liberty, signaled in a logical judgment in which God rewards and punishes human conduct in this world, checking it for compliance with the eternal law, so that God's action as judge depends on God's action as the legislator.

With Protestantism, the terms are inverted, to a Protestant, God's action as a judge is more important than that as a legislator. The individual's salvation does not depend on his earthly conduct but on such predestination, to heaven or to hell, which God for all eternity chose for him. Man's actions do not count against a decision taken by God for all eternity.

The closed voluntarism of Protestantism gets to place God's action as a legislator in a second plane. From the moment that the law is not the logical criterion for God to forgive a man, but salvation appears instead as an individual and concrete decision of the  Divine will, forgiving some and condemning others, whether a man observes the law or not, he will be saved or condemned not for observing it or violating it but because God willed it to be so. For a Protestant, God is judge, simply judge; His general legislating action means nothing for concrete salvation. For Calvin, Justice is purely and simply God's will when He acts as a judge. Protestant voluntarism which places the Divine Will above the Divine Laws makes God more important as a judge than as a legislator and entirely free to condemn or save solely at his own discretion without taking any kind of laws into consideration, even when He Himself has established them.
  
From those theological principles emanate the concept of law sustained by Calvin, with precedence over the norm. The law is for Calvin the perception of what is just, the sentiment of the just in any given case with independence from the norm; the law is a sentiment, it is reduced to the conscience of the magistrate who dictates the sentence.

We will later see the strange correspondence with the postulates which characterize the new law.

The Ciceronian equaling of the law with the judge takes in Calvin a sense different from that which the classics gave to it. When he picks up Cicero's passage according to which the law is a mute magistrate and the magistrate is the law alive, it will not be to subject the judge to the norm, not even to equate them, but to indicate that after the rulers, come the laws, to place the concrete before the general, equity before strict justice, the judge before the norm; all this in accordance with his position of transferring to the human judge the extreme arbitrary criteria which he had attributed to the Divine judge.

The foundation of such a position is that owing to the doctrine of predestination, the grace received by the judges allows them, in the privacy of their consciences, to sense the just more clearly than the way in which the legal norms establish it. The judges, in relation to human norms, are the law and are the precepts. For Calvinist voluntarism, the law does not obligate the judge, it is for the judge mere indicative advice, never imperative.

Such is the Calvinist doctrine regarding the superiority of the judges over the laws. Spokesmen for the Divinity itself, interpreters of revealed law in the deep of their consciences, they can well prescind from or contradict human norms because they are the living law and what they approve or prohibit is the law, the exclusively applicable law. God has conferred to them an inviolable majesty, will Calvin stress in his ¨Institution of the Christian Republic.¨ If what is important is God as a judge above God as a legislator, in accordance with the conception of predestination, the judges will be more important than the laws in translating to the juridical plane such theological proposition. The voluntarist measure in theology hops with ideological coherence to the realm of law. There will not be more authentic law than that which the judges dictate, be it approving, be it prohibiting in each concrete case.

To Calvin, the judges carve out the law with a supra-legal authority coming from their decisions to be just because of their having been inspired by God regardless of their content: such deified judges construct the law from their majestic pedestal of elected, it suffices for them to possess the grace of the just.

(To be continued)

Go to Chapter V Go back to Chapter III

domingo, 27 de octubre de 2019

The New Law, the New World Order, and the Cultural Revolution



By Alejandro Ordóñez Maldonado



(Continued)


III. From Legalist Fetishism to Judicial Fetishism

"For those societies which abandon
the austere cult of the truth for the idolatry
of ingenuity, there is no hope at all, 
after the sophisms, come the revolutions, 
and after the sophists, the executioners"

Juan Donoso Cortés

How delicate is the exercise of authority when justice is administered, when what is right is stated in each concrete case; how much risk of lacerating justice when we reduce the law to the words of the statute or, even worse, when we transform this into a phenomenon of power, forsaking our priesthood for justice.

We cannot reduce the judicial function to the rule of a law which often lacks legitimacy or to juridical technique, but neither can we hand it over to juridical imagination, which has turned into a source of law nowadays. A jurist must be conscious that his mission is not to be at the service of the law, but at the service of justice, he is not a functionary of the law but a server of justice on behalf of society. Without a doubt, a jurist has to seek the sense of the statute and has to abide by what the law prescribes but he has to interpret it as a function of what is fair, that is, of what is just in the concrete case.
"The judge should be faithful to the law, the law should be faithful to justice, and both of them should be faithful to the common good, but if the law is not faithful to justice, the judge cannot be faithful to the law."
Rightly has the perennial philosophy taught us: The text, understood as the juridical norm, gets its authority in the first place from the fact that it expresses natural law, not from the mandate dictated by a master, whether this be a prince, a Führer, a legislative assembly, a Kafkian bureaucracy or the aggregative sentences of a Court. Positive law receives its strength from the fact of containing justice; this is why, when an author who cannot be suspected of militating in the ranks of the new law, as was Saint Thomas, was asked whether the judge should be bound by what is written in the law, he responded:
"Not when the text runs against justice."
He even unequivocally asserts the following principle that any jurist has to have engraved in his conscience should he not want to become a law technician, a passive interpreter of the law or, what is the same, a slave of power.
"Lex esse non videtur quae justa non fuerit."
 Professor Tomás D, Cásares, in the quoted work summarizes in a modern manner the aforementioned principle in the following terms:
"There are situations where the conscience of what is just commands us to disobey the law. Not only is what the law commands not proper, but what it commands runs against what is proper. And when this happens, it commands without authority, which means that authority lies not in positive law by the mere fact of it being law but because of the reason by which it commands. The law is not imposed in our conscience, nor does it create a duty of justice from the fact of being law but from its intrinsic content, from the rightfulness of its purpose..."
 In like manner, Professor Álvaro D'ors confirms this, tersely but masterfully: "No legality without legitimacy", understanding it as conformity with the law but with a law more permanent than simple legality, one which does not depend on a social contract but on a suprapersonal cause, which is natural law, the classical juridical realism. This is how he explains it: 
"Relations amongst persons and the authority of those in power should be supported necessarily by an anterior and superior source to have justification. As Divine revelation is silent on almost everything concerning the temporal order, it is necessary to seek in nature, which is the work of God, the order which it may contain in conformity with the Divine plan. And this is the only solid possibility available to us, since, if no natural order exists, neither can there be justice, by it being left without an object above and beyond the will of those who impose it."
Abandonment of such legitimacy was translated into a growing discredit of legality and of democratic legitimacy, laws which the citizen neither understands nor loves, as per Rafael Gambra, in which only their constrictive character and their irrationality can be seen, and end up, as would be expected, being obeyed ever less.

With the former philosophy contrasts the conception of law which positivism has:
"The law deserves being obeyed, no matter what its contents, its 'material' justice, or its usefulness may be, only by reason of its 'form', because it proceeds from competent authority, because the competent will, invested by the social contract of free men has ordered it so,"
today dramatically contested by juridical post-modernity, meaning to be the New Law, which most certainly will end up dissolving it, consolidating another voluntarism headed by the judicial organs.

What a drama to reduce law to a simple system of norms! This was the temptation into which the juridical positivism fell, being it reduced to a simple form of social control, which gave rise to a reaction as noxious as the preceding one, which has been taking concrete form in what is now known as the 'New Law', in vogue in our courts of law, where the law disappears to give way to the subjective criterion that the judge may have of what is right; a very well camouflaged or quite technically administered subjectivism, with the pretext of the primacy of principles and values, which on purpose lack constitutional concretion but which are always brought up to interpret a law against the law or the constitution against itself, and which have as a purpose to ignore the limits that the law establishes, with which law ceases to be a fair objectivity to turn into an expression of the will of some technicians. This ends in the abolition of the rule of law, in a relativization of justice, in voluntarism which canonizes possible subjective injustices, and in the disappearance of the primacy of justice. It now even results to be admissible that constitutional judges modify laws by means of so-called aggregative sentences. As rightly pointed out by Geny: "allowing judges to be able to modify laws would be the most utter anarchy; it would be the subversion of law"; but today this is what is considered to be juridically correct.

Good it is to remember, this new philosophy has nothing to do with the juridical realism of Aristotelic and Thomistic lineage, as some people believe today; while it is true that for these, the law is what is just or, better said, the just thing due other, but what is just as something objective, embodied in the law by him who had the community under his charge for the common good, quite distant from the contemporary voluntarism and agnosticism without which knowing what is naturally just by means of reason was not deemed to be exotic.

The former, as Michelle Villey reminds us, would discern the natural institutions from those which opposed them as well as the justness from the unjustness of things. The will was not an originator of rights and neither was reason, the latter was a means to discover what is just in the manyfold social relationships.

A thing very different from the judicial activism present in the majority of our legal systems, where the judge turns into: "the legislating judge, the mediating judge, the hero judge, the controlling judge, the social operator judge". O tempora, o mores!

From another perspective, with the above coincides Spanish jurist Alejandro Nieto, who, on receiving the Honoris Causa title from Universidad Carlos III stated:
"Since if this is so, it is high time that we get rid of hypocresies and call things by their name ... High time that we stop cheating the citizens and misleading the students. Because it is not a matter of ignorance or of bad faith, but something much more serious, namely, that laws neither order society nor resolve conflicts but rather that, at most, they are guidelines, reference points that the legislator puts in the hands of functionaries and judges, knowing well that they will apply them very partially, and what will be decisive is not the will of the legislator but the personal criterion of the operator.
But, what will those criteria be which move the jurist to accept the law only to the extent that its content agrees with his judgement? Therefore, it is certain that they be personal opinions: which explains the difference in decisions and, in the second place, it will be a criterion foreign to or trascending the norm. Be it very clearly said: each juridical operator has a personal purpose in each concrete case: at due time, he contrasts the norm with such purpose and, if it is convenient to him, he will apply it, but if purpose and norm are not in consonance, he will reject the norm or twist it without scruple until it becomes useful to him... 
The theory of the purpose is something known, but notice that I am talking about the subjective, personal and selfish purpose of the juridical operator, and not of the objective and social purpose of the norm.
On hearing this, tear his gown whoever may wish to do so, but such is the reality, and I prefer to be condemned for scandal rather than being taken for a fool." 

(To be continued)

Go to Chapter

Go back to Chapter II

jueves, 17 de octubre de 2019


The New Law, the New World Order, and the Cultural Revolution


By Alejandro Ordóñez Maldonado

(Continued)


II. Function and Sacral Character of Authority


"You would have no power over me had
it not been given to you from above"
John XIX - 11

To exercise authority is to serve; not get served from it, from its function, from its power, from its ability to sacrifice the general interest in favor of unspeakable purposes. This principle we find glossed by Argentinian poet Leopoldo Marechal, but is ridiculed ad nauseam these days
            If you are offered a post where you are conspicuous
           accept it by reason of your merit alone
          look ahead to the fruits you will give to your people
          if an elm tree you are, refuse as a pear tree to serve
          otherwise you'll become just a counterfeit pear tree
          aside from becoming a dishonest elm.

Or by Saint Exupery in his posthumous work, Citadelle, in which he impugns the attitude so frequently endured by the peoples at the hand of the holders of power who serve of it themselves to satisfy their vanities and whims, and to promote their own business enterprises or those of their relatives.

          Positions and functions of high rank do tempt
          with the ever defenseless public gold
          or with the glitter of an investiture.
          Joseph, don't put your hands ever on monies
          which to your laudable virtue are entrusted...
          And regarding the glitter on you imposed,
          with coldness and indifference you'll carry
          as who out of obligation has to don
          a frac of persnickety decorum...

Such is the moral justification of authority; that's what it exists for, its limits are not capricious; if authority is made an instrument to attain other ends, it loses its legitimacy and credibility. Little does it matter whether its origin is legitimate if it is not ordered to the common good. Its misuse is the reason why rebellion against constituted autorities proliferates ever more these days. In face of this, subordinates distrust authority to such an extent, that an eagerness to prevaricate by anyone who holds an investiture is presumed until the contrary is proven, and unfortunately this is what happens now in contemporary society, in the public and the private spheres, there is no institution, no matter how respectable it may be, that can keep safe from this stigma,

And why? Why such a panorama? What is the cause?

Multiple explanations we find every day; from those who claim the inexorable emerging of a new morality which has nothing to do with that of our elders, to economy-centered explanations of social facts, passing through a multifarious libertarian fundamentalism which ends up erecting man as a subject of absolute rights.

Hazarding being accused of being a neo-Taliban fundamentalist, I have always believed that the loss of the sacral sense of authority is the only cause of its collapse. This loss is why those who exercise it believe that nothing limits them, but only their whim, their interest; how easy it is to prevaricate in such a way, and because of that, those who owe obedience see only unbearable arbitrariness in its exercise. That all authority comes from God as its supreme source is one thing, and a very different one is that its origin be an opinion poll. An authority based only on the threat of coaction, and which does not obligate in conscience is doomed to undergo perpetual disobedience; when duty is not lived as ethical or sacred, when it is considred just a hypothetical imperative, it is obeyed only before the presence of the police, and it is infringed whenever impunity seems to be certain. In vain will we make any efforts to reestablish order, any order, if we refuse to recognize to the author of order, to Him who told us "I am the way, the truth and the life", His kingship over consciences, over society, over law, over the State, over morals. In intellectual life, and in social life.

(to be continued)