Why I am hardly democratic. XVIII

Why I am hardly democratic

by Vladimir Volkoff

(Continued)

Translated by Roberto Hope from the Spanish translation of

Pourquoi je suis moyennement démocrate. (éditions du Rocher, 2002)

Chapter XVIII

.. and that it can no longer work, absolutely.

In the beauty of its original conception, which I have no reason to negate, democracy, stripping it off of its populist, egalitarian and moralizing, resonances, definitely comes to tell us that it is good that the members of a given group elect their leaders, and that it is good that their leaders fulfill the mandate conferred to them; that is, that they respect the opinion of their mandators. Up to here, there is nothing to criticize, except that the mandators of a different candidate may, perhaps, not be wrong.

We have read the reservations I have made respecting a collective opinion. But I could even get to admit that, to the extent that it could be considered to be the algebraic sum of the different individual opinions, not only its existence but also its legitimacy may be defended. Even the press has played a relatively honorable role in this matter, inasmuch as there have been organs that preach the contrary of one or the other. But alas, all this has changed, contemporary mass media have not only taken up the illusory concept of public opinion, but it has become a laughing matter. A quasi-unanimity advances automatically, thanks to the procedures to manipulate the information which, according to the experts, are resisted by not more than 7% of the population. But what is called public opinion can no longer be a sincere and independent judgment. The immense majority of the public becomes fully impregnated with the uniform thinking sung to it on a daily basis by the different information and disinformation organs (which differ in nothing other than their name, and which hammer more or less the same thing in unison).

This needs to be looked at carefully:

• in an authoritarian regime, you must obey authority, and you can think whatever you wish;
• in a totalitarian regime, you can actually disobey authority, but it is indispensable to think what the regime thinks;
• in a regime of absolute democracy, you no longer can think anything but what the authority thinks, and consequently, the notions of obedience or disobedience turn out to have been overcome. Something like this is what George Orwell had in mind when he depicted how his hero loved his torturer.

If democracy is a matter of opinion, the democratic mass media have made any democratic whim impossible.

Chapter XIX

Because we can elect nevertheless.

Current propaganda tends to make us believe that humankind has no option but to chose between democracy, the source of all good, and totalitarianism, the source of all evil.

This is false.

You can, of course, adhere to the theory according to which, in the course of history, all peoples have suffered under disastrous regimes, until, finally, the United States of America conceived an ideal constitution under which the Egyptians, the Sumerians, the Greeks of the age of Pericles, the mandarins of China and the aborigines of Australia would have been much happier, and that now has to be imposed on all nations of the world, whether they want it or not.

You might as well display greater respect and curiosity, and note that to elect rulers, there are other ways which are not democratic. Please don't quote Churchill to me: «Democracy is the worst of regimes, excepting all the rest». The quip is a bit amusing, but it literally does not mean anything, A look at history is enough to see that other systems have been satisfactory.

Monarchy, more or less hereditary, opposite to democracy on the one side and to «tyranny» on the other (that is, to dictatorship), has been the most extended regime in the world over millennia. It was so popular, that the Hebrews themselves, despite the advice of their elders, demanded a king to «be like the rest of the world» (I Samuel, VIII:5). The importance of inheritance has frequently been decisive: in ancient Egypt, it was not enough to be a son of the pharaoh to aspire to reign, it was necessary to be a son of the pharaoh and of his sister. The United States strove considerably to make Hirohito, the 124th emperor of Japan, confess that he was not of a divine race. Albert Camus, scarcely suspect of being reactionary, defined true monarchists as «those who reconcile their true love for the people with their disgust for democratic forms».

Let's be specific: hereditary monarchy was not a way of electing rulers but rather a way to avoid having to elect the ruler, the first election having been made once and for all, be it by election among peers, be it by means of a singular combat, be it as a consequence of chance attributed to the divinity, and such election would perpetuate itself for two reasons: one, on the grounds that the presumed qualities of the chief would be inherited by his children; the other, proceeding from an elemental corroboration: the installation of a new chief always takes a lot of effort, costs money, and sometimes blood, that it is worthwhile saving.

Under the republic, the Romans elected two consuls who, in case of need, relinquished their place in favor of a single and temporary dictator who had to be a retired consul and who would designate one of the active consuls after casting lots among themselves.

Julius Caesar, patrician if there ever were any, let himself be dragged to power by the rabble, at the price of a civil war. After him, the Roman Empire resorted to the adoption system; that is, the designation of the chief by his predecessor. This system worked more or less well until the time it was replaced by the system of acclamation: the legions named then their favorite general, that way creating instability which finally lead the State to perdition.

In Poland, the elective monarchy was entirely in the hands of the nobility — to such a degree that the unfavorable vote of a single nobleman could make the election fail — and yet, it has known times of glory.

Various countries have lived under oligarchical systems which fulfilled their duty perfectly: not many complaints have been known in the Republics of Venice or of Genoa for having adopted such a system.

If the princedom gave deplorable results in Russia — as the country would find itself fractured every time a prince who wished to endow his descendants equitably died — Western fiefdom, with its organic articulations of feudal lords, vassals, and valvasors, put the foundation of the world in which we live.

Both under the «tyranny» as under the democracy, ancient Greeks used to designate close to a thousand of their magistrates casting lots, which had the merit of giving an opportunity to competence and virtue from time to time.

In all civilizations, voting has frequently been one of the ways of electing rulers, but it was ordinarily a vote reserved to peers, the tribe chiefs, the patriarchs, the warriors, who had demonstrated their worth. Hugh Capet was elevated to honors by lords who practically were his peers, and the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire used to be chosen by hereditary electors.

The Pope is elected by a College of Cardinals who in turn has been designated by the Pope and elected from among bishops also named by a Pope. We are far from universal suffrage here.

Dictators who have grabbed power after a civil war, or simply after a war, or an intrigue, or a coup d'etat. have not always done a bad job, especially when compared with Hitler, elected in the most democratic way there is.

Generally, the ruling classes are recruited by heredity or by cooptation, very often by marriage, but their functions differ depending on the countries. French aristocracy was originally linked to the land; the Russian almost exclusively by its service to the Zar. A Portuguese nobleman who no longer has the means to «live nobly» loses his nobility.

All authority supposes the consent of those who recognize it, even if not based on a democracy. «I am your chief, I must follow you», a French official used to say, unconsciously echoing Burke: «Those who pretend to guide should in great measure follow. They should conform their proposals to the taste and talent and the character of those over which they wish to command». A French ambassador would become ecstatic about the ease with which Catherine the Great made herself be obeyed. She laughed: «I find out what they want to do and then I order it to them.»

If this is true, there is no authority which can be usurped for a long time, even when, for it to be legitimate the rulers do not depend on the whim of their subjects. Sometimes democracy guarantees this, but it also happens that it doesn't, at any rate, other systems do it as well as democracy.

(to be continued)

Go to chapters XX and XXI

Go back to Chapters XVI and XVII